A year after the start of the “special operation” in Ukraine, the Russian invasion has also highlighted Moscow’s disinformation strategy. David Colon, associate professor of history at the IEP in Paris and specialist in propaganda, returns for 20 minutes on the rooting of this doctrine in the history of the country.
In times of war, what use is propaganda?
All belligerents resort to propaganda to persuade the adversary of their forces and to address public opinion and mobilize it in their favour, these are the two main motivations. There are different types of tactics. It can be strategic communication: explaining why we are at war, presenting the adversary as the source of the conflict, violating the laws of war, etc. These may be information operations aimed at intoxicating the adversary for tactical purposes. And it can be psychological warfare to weaken the resilience of the adversary or his population in the war context.
Can we put Russian and Ukrainian propaganda on the same level?
No, absolutely not, because Russian propaganda has been characterized for decades, at least a century, by the systematic recourse to what the Russians call maskirovkamilitary disinformation, and what they call since 1948 the desinformatsiya, that is, misinformation. This is characterized by the use of false information or conspiracy theories to sometimes sow confusion or chaos in the adversary, sometimes to sow confusion in people’s minds and, this, to his advantage.
In other words, disinformation is an integral part of Russian information warfare doctrine, while Ukraine so far has had no need to systematically resort to disinformation as long as it is sufficient to draw the attention of world public opinion to the fate reserved for him. When two countries accuse each other of invading each other, only one is telling the truth.
What are the main Russian disinformation narratives?
The Ukrainians are Nazis, Russia has allegedly been attacked by NATO, NATO has secret laboratories in Ukraine, etc. Russia also encourages mistrust within democratic societies by encouraging skepticism in all its forms, by amplifying all protest movements, without marked political preference, and this has led Russia to increase the themes of disinformation in its propaganda. It has relays of influence which are all the more important in France since our country, on the one hand, has been subject to Russian interference for nearly 150 years and, on the other hand, has been characterized for more than a century by the force of its anti-Americanism.
In a year of war, how have the messages evolved?
They have not evolved, they are identical to the type of propaganda that Russia has been using for a century, that is to say that it is first of all a matter of strategic communication which aims to deter Western countries to come to the aid of Ukraine, in particular by highlighting the issue of the risk of nuclear escalation. And this strategic communication worked remarkably well in 2014. It continues to produce these effects today.
Russia has long implemented a communication strategy that is based on the perfect blurring of the boundary between the state of war and the state of peace. And from this point of view, it has no interest in getting out of the uncertainty that it itself launched and exploited. It was this uncertainty that allowed him to conquer Crimea in 2014 without Western countries reacting. It is this uncertainty that allows it today to deploy its propaganda in Western countries and, beyond, in Africa, Latin America and Asia with some success.
What are the relays of Russian propaganda?
Russia uses, as it has done for at least a century, different vectors. Most Russian propaganda and disinformation is done in the open in a transparent fashion, commonly referred to as white propaganda. Russian public diplomacy relays the Kremlin’s strategic communication at the same time as its psychological warfare operations, and that is very original. And, if you take the case of France, the news agencies first, then the media, systematically repeat the statements of Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russian diplomats.
So that Russia does not need to resort to particularly complex operations to influence public debate in France. Russian propaganda is then relayed by its international media which, while being banned from broadcasting in France, remain accessible on the Internet under certain conditions. There is also manipulation of information on digital socio-media, whether fake media websites, fake NGOs, discussion forums, content platforms, social networks (Twitter, Instagram, TikTok) and encrypted messengers like Telegram. And finally, Russia has many agents of influence in France: networks of experts, soldiers, former spies, journalists, politicians.
Vladimir Putin designated the West as the enemy who wants to “finish off Russia” in his speech of February 21, 2023. Is this the new adversary after Ukraine and the “Ukronazis”?
This formula is nothing new. In 2022, he declared in his speech that the West had tried after 1990 “to sink us, finish us off and destroy us for good”. The term Ukronazis was already also used in 2014. It must be understood that Vladimir Putin is a KGB man. He spent most of his career before the collapse of the USSR in counterintelligence. He continues to apply to the letter and with consistency the principles of propaganda taught to him by the KGB, of which he was an officer, and the FSB, of which he was the director.
From my point of view, there is no form of innovation. The innovations are on our side: these are the social media platforms, their advertising targeting tools that Russia has used to spread its disinformation campaigns on a large scale. And, therefore, we have served on a plate to Russia the tools it uses to turn them against us.
Can we say that Russia has won the information war?
To determine whether or not you win a war, you have to consider what the war aims are. The initial war goal was the overthrow of the Ukrainian government within 72 hours and replaced by a pro-Russian government. It was a coup, which failed. Now, what is Russia’s war aim? Is it really to take over the whole of Ukraine? I do not believe that. Is it, on the other hand, to weaken its adversaries by a frozen conflict and to count on the passage of time to change public opinion against aid to Ukraine? That, I believe.
Polls published on 15th February in the United States show that public support for arms and ammunition transfers to Ukraine has dropped below 50%. If we look at the results of certain elections since the outbreak of the war, Turkey’s attitude towards Sweden’s NATO membership, we constantly see signs of small victories for informational Russia.
This is an extremely important point, because when you are not able to win the war on the ground, you are left with a ground, that of information, on which you can win. And what Russia is leading today is the battle of world opinion.
