Immediately after Russian tanks invaded Ukraine on a February night almost two years ago, there was a distribution of roles at the top of the invaded country’s leadership. Its president, the former actor Volodymyr Zelensky, focused on what he did best: communicating while appealing to foreign audiences to win their support for Ukraine. Your Commander-in-Chief, Valeri Zaluzhny, appointed just seven months earlier, took charge of defense military affairs. Under his command, the Russians were first stopped in their march toward the capital and then repelled from several areas, including Kiev. The territories may be temporarily lost, but what matters, they say, is the weakening of the Russian army.
The dismissal of Zaluzhni marks the end of this separation, which was already strained last autumn. The Ukrainian army did not achieve the desired result with its summer counteroffensive and Zaluzhni began to act even more independently, while speaking to the Western press about the “dead end” at the front. It was Zaluzhni who allegedly delayed the start of the counteroffensive because the West was moving too slowly to deliver the promised modern weapons. It was Zaluzhni that Zelensky and his circle ultimately credited with “the stalemate” at the front, where the Ukrainian army went into defense in the face of growing Russian pressure.
For Zaluzhni, who is used to talking about military strategies with detailed calculations of available equipment and forces, this shift to defense makes a lot of sense given the critical shortage of ammunition and new arms shipments from allies abroad. But not for Zelensky, who as a politician fears little more than a “frozen” conflict that would simply give Russia more time to rearm before it finally takes over all of Ukraine.
“Only military defeats can make Russia strive for peace,” he said emphatically in the speech after firing Zaluzhni. It is Ukrainian victories, such as the surprise victories in Kiev, Kharkiv and Kherson in the first year of the invasion, that would help maintain Allied confidence in Ukraine’s ability to regain all occupied territories.
Given the disappointing counteroffensive and Russia’s continued pursuit of “Ukraine fatigue” abroad, they increasingly doubt Ukraine’s ability to do so. However, this remains the declared goal of Zelensky, who firmly believes in the success of the Ukrainians. And although the mood in the country has become more pessimistic, the majority of Ukrainians trust him, more than 75%, and no major political force currently offers a different scenario.
If the situation remains dire, with insufficient weapons arriving and casualties mounting, more citizens may become receptive to the idea of limited territorial commitments to Russia, some sociologists say. However, what Russia did in Bucha and continues to do in other occupied territories is, for many, an effective antidote.
By removing his relatively autonomous commander-in-chief, trusted by 94% of Ukrainians, and appointing a more loyal successor, Zelensky hopes to overcome the “stagnation” on the front, where currently “only defense is out,” suggests Myjailo Podoliak, adviser its administration. He expects a plan for 2024 from the new commander.
The new commander-in-chief, General Oleksandr Syrsky, appears to be a promising candidate for Zelensky’s goals. Despite being born and educated in Russia, he is unlikely to attract as widespread public affection as Zaluzhni. Known for its steadfast defense of Bakhmut, where the Ukrainian army suffered some of the heaviest casualties of the war, it is likely to be more open to attack opportunities even in the current unfavorable situation. He is supported in this by a younger generation of generals who are familiar with the tactics that have helped the Ukrainian army achieve unexpected success, inflicting heavy losses on the Russian army despite superior equipment. While Syrsky himself remains a polarizing figure, at least some of these battle-hardened commanders are highly respected by soldiers.
Whoever is in command, the Army must use its limited resources more efficiently. The mobilization must become stronger after a new law is soon passed in parliament to reinforce the exhausted soldiers and prevent the Russian advance. However, few dispute the need to streamline Army administration and ensure that new recruits receive better training.
Another area on which Ukraine is pinning its hopes is the massive use of drones and other modern technologies that could at least partially offset delays in military aid from abroad and save more lives of its soldiers. The colonel is expected Vadym Sukharevsky is appointed head of the newly created Army Front Forces because he managed to minimize casualties among soldiers through the use of drones.
Even if much of it is done quickly, major successes are unlikely given the shortage of new weapons and ammunition, military analysts warn. They warn that there is a greater need to strengthen defenses and that the risky replacement of the popular commander could prove counterproductive. Ultimately, however, that’s how it is Zelensky has “political and military responsibility” of the result, emphasizes Podoliak. And risk is something Zelensky has never shied away from, for better or worse.