In about a month, Russians will vote to elect the country’s president and longtime leader. Wladimir Putin, will certainly secure his fifth term in the Kremlin. I had already predicted this outcome in 2013, although I did not imagine a war in Ukraine, but ten years ago it seemed clear to me that the current ruler of Russia will sometimes die in office at a very old age.
How did Russia come to reject the democratic transition of power in favor of a lifelong presidency for Putin? I would argue that it emerged from a combination of historical background and traditions on the one hand and sophisticated policies of the ruling elites on the other.
First of all, it should be noted that the history of Russia since the founding of Moscow as an empire, even before it became Russia in the modern sense, has been built on the drive for territorial expansion and imperial aspirations. Furthermore, for centuries the nation has been driven by a sense of uniqueness – religious, cultural, ideological and military – that has merged with the country’s identity. Since the founding of modern Russia in the 16th century, it has relied economically on the use of its vast natural resources, so the right of the central government to redistribute the country’s wealth has never been questioned. All this makes the strong centralized political system quite natural for Russia.
Secondly, I would say that since he became national leader in 1999, Putin’s team has done an excellent job of orchestrating a very slow but gradual change in the social system by trading economic freedom for political expression. The system, which at the same time proclaimed respect for laws and regulations but required massive exclusions and linked business to public services, seemed very familiar to Russians and they got used to it quite quickly. The authorities managed to please the common people through huge increases in pensions and social spending, creating the feeling that for the first time people had a fair share of the country’s wealth. And finally, Putin and his team had spoken to their people much more simply and transparently than the liberal opposition.
In addition, the Kremlin has masterfully used state propaganda that was well received by the Russian people. Back in 2010, I argued that the Russia of the 2000s had nothing to do with the Soviet Union of the 1970s: the emerging new authoritarian order was built without the Soviet ban on information – even now the Internet is largely free and the resources are “hostile.” With the easily accessible Kremlin and the sealed Soviet borders, Russians can leave their country without major problems, even in times of war. Reproducing a largely authoritarian system in a country where people are personally free was an incredible achievement by the Kremlin leadership that should be examined in detail by Western analysts. I would like to add here that Putin had actually used around ten years – starting with the annexation of Crimea – to change the priorities of the Russians: the so-called “Crimea consensus” put geopolitical and ideological aspects above people’s heads. the economic and became the foundation that enabled Russia to weather a decade of Western sanctions and economic downturn without visible political discontent, and that prepared it to face even greater external pressures arising from President Putin’s bold Ukraine -Adventures resulted.
Today there is no doubt that Putin has no major opponents. The Russian opposition, now largely living abroad, has ultimately abandoned all issues vital to its compatriots and focused on supporting Ukraine, which is why it is viewed as traitors by the majority of the Russian population. Internal critics may attract some supporters who are unwilling to support them (e.g Boris Nadezhdinthe Liberal presidential candidate was disqualified by the Central Election Commission, almost no one protested against the decision).
In my opinion, the current strength of the Putin regime is based on two pillars. On the one hand, few people know how many Russians – and not only the highest bureaucrats and “siloviki”, but also state employees of all ranks, businessmen, wealthy city dwellers and even pensioners – are interested in the stability of the current regime. Maybe I’m wrong, but I would say that if it collapsed tomorrow, there would be more losers than winners in Russian society, at least in the short term, but the immediate consequences are the most important for most societies. On the other hand, Putin’s team has proven to be very solid – even during the war almost no one defected – and even if Vladimir Putin were to leave, one could argue that his system can survive the challenge, especially if it doesn’t arrive overnight.in the morning, but at least in a somewhat expected way.
Today, Putin’s elite effectively owns Russia and recognizes that the benefits that this position brings outweigh the discontent that could arise from forced cooperation within the country. In contrast, the anti-Putin forces are now fighting each other more fiercely than the Kremlin because they have nothing to defend.
My final thought will be that as of early 2024, the Kremlin is quite advanced in both its war effort and its pressure on the public, so there are many opportunities to deradicalize itself if such a move were necessary (in other words to decide on it). another “Medvedev era” when Putin leaves), so all of this should force us to think again about whether those who declare that Putin’s days are over are right. Although personalist authoritarian regimes rarely outlive their founders, the Russian case may evolve in a strikingly different style, paving the way for regime change and survival well into the 2030s.