Seven days later, Israel resumed the offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip after the final collapse of the first ceasefire agreement with the Palestinian Islamist organization that carried out the October 7 massacre in which nearly 1,200 Israelis died. There was no agreement between the parties to extend a fragile ceasefire that, however, allowed for the release of more than a hundred hostages held by Hamas in exchange for the release of 240 Palestinian prisoners and the provision of humanitarian aid in Gaza. Negotiations for a renewed cessation of hostilities continue as the international community puts pressure on Israel to reduce civilian casualties in the enclave, where more than 14,000 people have died. Professor of political science at Boston University, Leila FarsakhAuthor of the book “Rethinking Statehood in Palestine”, analyzes the implications in dialogue with LA RAZÓN.
Did you see the ceasefire agreement and its extensions as a starting point for a somewhat more lasting peace in Gaza? Netanyahu and Israeli army commanders had promised to continue their operation in the Gaza Strip to destroy Hamas.
She was not entirely sure whether the ceasefire agreements would allow for a longer-lasting peace in Gaza. Rather, it was an attempt to gauge the extent to which the war Israel started has had to adapt or resume its cruel approach that has killed more than 14,000 Palestinians, 40% of whom are children, and has already worsened a terrible humanitarian crisis in Gaza The population still had an unemployment rate of over 45% and a poverty rate of 80% before October 7th. The release of the hostages gave everyone pause, but also strengthened the line of those pushing for a permanent ceasefire that would allow Israel to maintain northern Gaza and gradually facilitate the arrival of humanitarian aid into Gaza. It is still too early to say what a new “modus vivirdi” will look like, but the current “status quo” is irretrievable. Israel may try to eliminate Hamas and may succeed in weakening or destroying its military wing, but it is unlikely to destroy its political and social influence. Israel tried the same thing in 1982 with the PLO, which it classified as a terrorist organization at the time but made peace with in 1993.
Is it possible that the Palestinian Authority will take over administration of the Gaza Strip after the war? What other alternatives are there?
The Palestinian Authority is very weak and lacks legitimacy. It is too early to say whether Israel will retain control of the Gaza Strip and find some local or former Fatah members to run it, or whether the Palestinian Authority will regroup to maintain security coordination with Israel and can control the Gaza Strip. This will also depend on the length of the war and the options in Israel, as Netanyahu’s government may not last longer than three months.
Neither Iran, nor Hezbollah in Lebanon, nor the Houthis in Yemen, nor the other Iranian “proxies” in the region were involved in the conflict. The ceasefire reduces the likelihood of them doing this. Could this scenario change?
No country in the region wants a regional war, and that is why neither Iran nor Yemen nor Hezbollah are doing more than condemning Israel and not interfering. I doubt that will change.
Hamas’s brutal attack on October 7 brought the Palestinian issue to the center of the debate, when it appeared to be virtually overcome for Arab countries, especially the Gulf states. Can there be full normalization with Israel without a real solution for the Palestinians?
The events of October 7 demonstrated once again that the Palestinian issue cannot be ignored or “solved” by fragmenting the Palestinians or pursuing a peace process that divides Palestinians territorially and politically. Without protecting the political and human rights of Palestinians, no normalization is possible. The Arab streets continue to champion the Palestinian cause, and no Arab country wants to accept Palestinian refugees, as Israel has tried to do by bombing the Gaza Strip and driving 1.3 million Palestinians into the southern Gaza Strip. It is in the interest of the various states in the region to save the two-state solution to end the conflict, and it is also the only way to protect the Israelis. The only problem is that with the expansion of settlements since 1993 and the relocation of 500,000 settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Israel has ended the two-state solution, raising suspicions that the region and the United States need We will continue to affirm that we want to implement the two-state solution and find new formulas for what that means in practice.
