The Russia-Ukraine war has entered its fourth year, and while this timeframe may seem too short to resolve centuries of tension between the two nations, it’s long enough to derive valuable lessons for those responsible for international decision-making. One key takeaway is that an imperialist and aggressive nation, once it has begun attacking its neighbors, will not stop on its own. This isn’t unique to Putin’s Russia; Yeltsin’s Russia in the 1990s exhibited similar behavior. The international community’s silence after Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008 and its modest reaction to the annexation of Crimea and the initiation of hostilities in Donbás in 2014 essentially paved the way for a large-scale invasion.
If the great powers had supplied Ukraine with the same level of weapons and financial support in 2014 as they did in 2022, instead of attempting to negotiate with Putin through diplomatic channels like the Minsk agreements, it’s probable that the war could have been avoided. Dictators are not convinced by negotiations; they accumulate power to ignore restrictions and reject conditions, regardless of how favorable they might be.
Another crucial lesson is that sanctions and financial restrictions can be effective against small or controlled economies but are less so against large, market-oriented economies. Despite three years of sanctions, the Russian economy remains in good shape and is growing, with oil exports redirected from the West to countries like China and India. The losses incurred by EU nations due to increased oil prices and the nationalization of foreign investments in Russia outweigh the costs Russia has paid for its aggression, including the freezing of its assets abroad.
The sanctions imposed on European and American exports have handed the Russian market over to Chinese companies. Moreover, personal sanctions against businessmen and bureaucrats have unified these groups around Putin, rather than causing internal strife within the elites. Rather than weakening the Russian economy, the sanctions have moved it away from the West, increased state control over businesses, and transformed it into a more militarized economy.
It’s also clear that dictators are often more reckless than they are powerful. Putin launched his attack on Ukraine with the assumption that the West would remain passive and not intervene. As the conflict escalated, the Russians announced numerous “red lines” that could not be crossed, only to see more than 20 of these lines breached without altering Russia’s strategy. This suggests that the West would have been better off realizing from the outset that the conflict could only be won on the battlefield and providing Ukraine with the necessary military aid and ammunition. Russia cannot be defeated by economic sanctions alone; it can only be defeated militarily, which is the sole way to repel Putin’s aggression.
Furthermore, the West has proven to be weaker than initially thought at the beginning of the war. In contrast to the significant increase in military spending by the USA in the years leading up to World War II, NATO countries have increased their defense spending by less than 25 percent between 2021 and 2024. Both European and American military-industrial complexes are reluctant to increase production, neglecting new patterns of warfare. Western governments seem to have forgotten that increased defense spending can be a source of economic growth. For instance, in 1986, the USA spent 6.2 percent of its GDP on defense while experiencing solid growth, and Poland is currently growing at 2.9 percent with military expenses exceeding 4 percent of its GDP. Most EU nations, however, do not meet the 2 percent threshold required by NATO, citing fiscal imbalances as an excuse.
In light of these lessons, the time has come for the West to realize it must regain its status as a significant military production power, rather than relying on purchasing ammunition from around the world. The notion of the “end of history” should be set aside in favor of a more realistic foreign policy based on “new containment.”
Regarding the potential end of the conflict, many argue that the war must stop, even if it means ceding part of Ukraine’s sovereign territory to Russia. However, it’s essential to remember that of the 285 armed conflicts since the end of World War II, fewer than 20 were wars between recognized sovereign states. Almost all interstate wars have ended with borders intact. If Ukraine loses territory to Russia, Putin will have succeeded in destroying the international order established after 1945, making military force a viable means to redraw borders and alter geopolitical balances. The implications of such a change are unimaginable, making a firm peace in Ukraine, sadly, unattainable.
The war in Ukraine will not end in 2025 unless the West finds a way to repel Russian aggression without pressuring Ukraine to accept Putin’s terms. This brings us back to the initial lesson: imperialist power does not stop unless it is defeated or faced with a superior force. The path forward requires a realization of this truth and a commitment to supporting Ukraine in a way that acknowledges the nature of the threat it, and the world, faces.